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1 Introduction 
In international environmental law, forest law is often perceived as undeveloped area of 
law. Major threats posed from multidimensional environmental crisis facing planet 
earth and the humanity: climate change, loss of forest biodiversity, deforestation, and 
environmental degradation have been evident due to unbinding, unprincipled and 
uncoordinated nature of forest law; and represent a significant pressure on the world’s 
community of states. Because of the growing concerns about the consequences of such 
environmental crisis on human life, and health as well as the environment on its own 
sake, there have been wide spread legal attempt to clarify and articulate the 
underpinning values and objectives of international forest policies which can grace the 
road to further development of binding international forest law. 
 
However, there exists a tension between claims of absolute sovereignty over forest 
resources and the overarching and increasingly accepted forest protection legal regimes 
which could guide the establishment of binding international forest law: the ‘no-harm 
rules’, CBD, UNFCCC, the principles of common but differentiated responsibility, the 
principle of state responsibility, and the trans-boundary cooperation. The international 
environmental law considerations of deforestation, and forest degradation problems 
require more than what is currently existing at principle levels.  
 
Furthermore, the important role for a set of general legal principles, objectives, and 
procedures underpinning forest protection, and setting the parameters and establishing 
ground rules for global forest law attract global attention and soften states sovereignty 
as a shield to destroy forests. Indeed, the concept of states sovereignty exists as 
important principle to express a state’s equality with other states on international forum. 
Therefore the researcher, in the presented thesis deals with the question of how to put a 
possible balance between these two competing domestic and international interests as 
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the core concern of the research. To do so, the researcher employs textual legal analysis 
method in to the relevant literatures.  
 
1.1 Main research questions and structure of the research 
1.1.1 The research questions 
The main research questions in this thesis include: 
1. Is sovereignty a key obstacle for the development of binding 
international forest law? 
 
2. Can states because of sovereignty violate available principles 
and conventions to destroy forests with impunity or are 
there some balancing mechanisms? 
 
1.1.2 The structure of the Thesis 
In this Thesis, I use textual analysis approach to present:  
a) The introduction, justification and objectives of the Thesis in Chapter 
1. 
b) In Chapter 2, the concept of state sovereignty and its legal 
implication. The issues to be discussed are sovereignty over forest 
resources at the core of international law, important limitations on 
sovereignty, and international environmental law principles 
pertaining to protection of forests. 
c) Chapter 3 discusses international Environmental law treaty regimes 
that play important role in the development of global forest law. In 
this unit, the significant role provisions of CBD, UNFCCC play in 
forest protection, and the REDD climate mitigation mechanism 
which is currently developing under UNFCCC will be searched and 
dealt with. 
d)  Chapter 4 provides conclusions. The Thesis summarizes the 
discussions. 
 6 
1.2  Justification and Objectives 
Under international environmental law principles, and the environmental treaty regimes, 
the erosion of forests ecosystem, in particular the threat to forests across the globe, 
through deforestation and forest degradation, mandates the international community to 
scale up what we might think of as national resources into the ranks of centre of global 
concern. The international community is thus enjoined with the duty to greatly concern 
and must join responsibility to take steps needed to halt and safeguard forests as the 
base of essential foundations of life on earth. 
 
Most environmental problems have been observed that they require global solutions and 
international community have demonstrated their international cooperation through 
various environmental treaties. These treaties can influence the development of 
customary law in so far as they establish support for certain basic rules or principles at 
domestic level. For example, the Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties states that 
agreement must be respected (pacta sunt servanda), and states must accordingly act in 
good faith (article 26). 
 
This entails that states compliance with their duties under international environmental 
(forest) law is a continuous obligation of fulfilling international obligations under 
treaties. Such obligations, however, seems lacking in many of developing forest nations, 
or may be despite the existence of law on protection of forests, its implementation may 
not gain special attention as opposed to forest conversion. As a result environmental 
degradation, deforestation in particular, is an ongoing issue that is causing extinction 
and changes to climate condition.  
 
Nevertheless, the Conventions, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 
United Nations Frame work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the 
contents of REDD: a forestry based climate mitigation instrument under UNFCCC 
currently on negotiation should not be overlooked by states, though the provisions of 
these conventions are conditional in some instances.  
 
This is because it is impossible for states to seek asylum in state sovereignty to destroy 
forests which is the essential foundation of life on earth as an end in itself. Therefore, to 
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find instruments and arguments to achieve the decision makings in the direction of the 
above conventions, it is warranted that forests gain central positions in environmental 
matters. This is because of forests value and their protection costs in comparison to their 
conversion, cheap and easy.  
 
Most importantly the ecosystem’s sustainability that constitutes the conditions of 
immense importance for life emanating from forests again warrants due regards to 
forests and their protection. It also necessitates the above conventions to be interpreted 
as valid international treaty law which further induces the development of a binding 
forest law despite currently such rigidly enforceable international forest law with 
penalty is nonexistent.  
 
This Thesis is, however, designed with objective of making textual analysis as to how 
international environmental principles: the Rio Principle 2 (Stockholm Principle 21), 
and conventions such as CBD, UNFCCC, the REDD mechanism, and the secondary 
rules entailing state responsibility can directly be applied to strike a balance between 
global approach to protection of forests as common interest and states’ exclusive 
sovereignty over forests as domestic resources.  
The following are particular objectives of the Thesis. 
I.  Legal content and status of sovereign states rights to exploit their 
resources in accordance with their own national environmental 
policies (Rio Declaration Principle-2, CBD Arts. 3 – the ‘no- 
harm rule’); 
II. How the CBD, UNFCCC and the development of REDD under 
UNFCCC as a global environmental concern raised by global 
forest decline are coherent with development of international 
forest law, and; 
III. To discuss how state responsibility as a secondary obligation in 
states management of forest resources; and the human rights apply 
in protection of forests. 
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1.3 Methodology 
1.3.1 Sources 
In the presented Thesis, the researcher used major international legal agreements related 
to protection of forests such as global treaties-CBD, the 1992 Rio Declaration, 
UNFCCC; ‘soft law’ instruments and Human rights conventions. The UN Charter, ICJ 
cases, text books, Google scholars, legal journals written by highly publicized scholars, 
and peer reviewed articles are also paid attention and hence thoroughly consulted as 
main legal sources. Owing to the relatively young age of my study subject, most of the 
literatures consulted are, however, from the University of Oslo’s electronic books, 
articles and more other writings of different forms. Nevertheless, these sources are 
academic databases which the University of Oslo pays for. Thus I find them to be 
reliable sources of information deem consulted.  
 
1.3.2 Delimitations and Limitations of the study 
While writing this Thesis, I well know the tremendous importance of the search for 
laws and the increasing of researches in the area of protection of forests. This is because 
forests are globally common concerns of prime importance in many regards to be dealt 
with in this Thesis. The issue of state’s sovereignty over forests as national resources 
and its exploitation as it sees fit, however, exists at important centre of international law 
and hence puts brakes on the process and progress of speedy realization of the search 
for laws on the protection of forests. Nevertheless, few international agreements are 
prevailing as coercive machinery pertinent to the regulation of forest issues. Therefore, 
though the numbers of applicable framework conventions are substantial, only few of 
them and treaties with binding nature are to be dealt with as the main legal instruments 
relevant in the protection of forests.  
Conducting a research by collecting data and collating has been the interest of the 
researcher; time and resources, however, have become the main hindrances to 
materialize this. Thus the researcher makes pure analytical presentation of various 
related literatures to bridge the gap. 
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1.3.3 Significance of the study 
The significance of this research: 
1. May help as information feed for some institutions that have direct 
link and legal interest inter alia in protection of forests.  
 
2. Might be used by other scholars who want to conduct further 
research on the same/related subjects. 
 
3. Any section of the society who is interested in its content and 
discussion may refer to it as a helpful reference material. 
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2  States Sovereignty and International (National) Approaches to 
Protection of Forests 
To make an analysis to the domestic and global approach to protection of forests; this 
research builds upon the existing literatures that discuss issues such as state sovereignty, 
state responsibility, biodiversity, climate change condition, common concerns etc. An 
assessment of these existing legal principles is so important in that they serve as 
benchmarks for immerging international forest law. These hard legal provisions of the 
international forest regimes exist under different covers such as CBD, UNFCCC and in 
international customary law. Other issues are subject to soft law.  
 
I argue that the foundation of fundamental rules of international law, such as the 
relevant international initiatives after the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED), held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro; and the dialogues that 
have emerged at various layers to address (social, legal, ecological) issues related to 
protection of forests have legal relevance in uncovering converging expectations and 
hence normative developments in protection of forests.  
 
2.1 State Sovereignty over Natural Resources-Forests 
In international law, the principle of state sovereignty has the implication of both 
“territorial integrity”-the rule against intervention, and “political independence”-self 
governing of nation states
1
. These two aspects of state sovereignty entail the prerogative 
rights that states enjoy over subjects within their national jurisdiction. These rights may 
include the states exercise of their rights in their territory as they sees fit irrespective of 
the negative consequences they may bear on the rights of other states. These rights seem 
absolute and exclusive 
                                                 
1
 Charter of the United Nation: Article 2(4) 
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The development of International law does not authorize interference with concerns that 
are considered solely of states internal matters. This statement is affirmed in Article 2 
(7) of the UN Charter. Forests, due to their location within the exclusive territory of a 
particular state, seem to be covered by the provision of this article as state’s natural 
resources over which the state has the right to manage according to its own needs. The 
exceptional situation in the last statement of Article 2 (7) above, in which case 
interference with states national issues is allowed by international law does not 
explicitly include protection of forests.  
 
Traditional international law (the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States) also maintain the privilege of states in managing [forest] resources2. 
Similar provisions are also reflected in Rio Principle 2 (Stockholm Principle 21): 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law the sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and 
developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction. (Emphasis added) 
 
This principle embodies the core: states are “in principle”, free to decide how to manage 
their forest resources and utilize; whether and to what extent they will protect their 
environment. The second statement in the above provision however, requires that states 
must make sure that their activities at home do not produce significant negative 
consequences on the environment of others. These two salient features of sovereignty 
principle in relation to protection of forests outline the two meanings of sovereignty: the 
rights granted to states and the responsibilities imposed upon them by law. 
  
Explanation of these privilege and accountability associated with sovereignty principle 
can be employed to enrich the meaning of sovereignty. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: Article 8.  
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The right associated with sovereignty (Maguire 2010, P. 32) implies the ability to 
exercise power over defined area, and citizens with in its boundary, i.e., the freedom of 
having power to organize and control activities and peoples within the state’s boundary. 
Nevertheless, this exercise of sovereignty in the context of protection of forests global 
wise is distinctive. At international level, sovereignty implies the equal footing of a 
state with other states in an international arena. So each state may have their national 
exigencies to reflect on an international proceeding. “Within the international forestry 
arena, each state is coming together to protect its sovereign rights in relation to forestry, 
while accepting that some common standards might be created between all state parties 
concerning forests.”3  
 
Therefore, unlike its provisions in the UN Charter, sovereignty in terms of protection of 
forests at global level does not necessarily entail sovereignty as an inalienable concept 
in an absolute term. That is to say, when states have common concern which requires 
common responsibility; for example, shared responsibility in curbing changes in 
climatic condition, this requires them to reach on consensus. Such instances may soften 
sovereignty whereby sovereignty entails responsibility. “This new responsibility might 
either maintain state sovereignty in case where the international obligations are similar 
to existing domestic legislation, or weaken it where states have to adjust existing 
domestic laws.”4  
 
But, this raises an important legal question against the statement in Rio Principle 2: is 
there an international obligation on a state to protect its own environment? The answer 
to this question is also imperative. Cassese (2005, p. 487; Birnie, 2009, pp. 128-129; 
Brunnee 1996, p. 309) observe environment as common public facility (public - in 
international context), in protection of which all states should have legal and practical 
interests whether the damage is inflicted where.  
 
                                                 
3 Maguire (2010) p. 33  
 
4
 Ibid. 
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How other states express their interests when damage is inflicted on the environment of 
one state by the state itself is presented in the ‘no-harm rule’ the details of which I 
discuss in the next unit. Nonetheless, the legal implications of this “responsibility” are 
not vividly stated, no guide lines are convincingly provided (see generally Birnie, 2009 
ch.3 sec. 4). Yet, the limitation on sovereignty of states is recurrent in the present 
discussions of environmental concerns by various environmental law scholars. 
However, it does not seem to be much invoked consistently because of its exact 
contents as: 
 The balancing of interests between states 
 The “due diligence”-care criterion 
 The duty to control the activities on its territory 
 Strict liability for the harm done, etc.,  
 
The problem of sovereignty principle with regards to the above responsibility contents 
is crystal clear and it exemplifies that sovereignty over forests as natural resources 
occupies the heart of international law pertaining to protection of forests. This argument 
can be interpreted as the threshold when it triggers the applicability of state 
responsibility is not well established. From forests perspective, in particular, the 
principle is not firmed as a rule in which strict liability may be established and 
pronounced upon states that violate the rule.
5
 In law, certain conditions must be met in 
order for the legal rules to be established and executed.  
 
The following are lists of conditions for rules in law made by International 
Development Legal Organizations:
6
 
 A set of legally binding rules which are known in advance. 
 
 That these rules be enforced in practice. 
                                                 
5
 Ibid, pp.21-22  
 
6
 International Development Legal Organization (2008) 
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 That mechanisms exist to ensure the proper application of the rules by 
properly functioning institutions, and that mechanisms allow for 
departure from the rules as needed according to established procedures. 
 
 That conflict in the application of these rules is resolved through the 
binding decisions of an independent judicial or arbitral body. 
 
 That there are known procedures for amending these rules when they no 
longer serve their purpose. 
 
Maguire notes that the above lists of requirements for rule of law are nonexistent in 
protection of forests.
7
 There is, therefore, no legally binding forest law pertaining to 
protection of forests per se.
8
 Maguire continues explaining that international rules 
related to protection of forests are available only in the form of soft-law instruments 
such as principle of United Nations Forum on Forests.
9
 To uphold the rules or not to 
comply with is up to states free will.
10
 In other words, the rules are not in a form of 
coercive machinery, therefore, obedience is voluntary. The lack of legally binding 
international forest rules, therefore, undermines the other requirements discussed 
above.
11
  
 
The obligations delineated under soft law are relative to the situations in the states. As a 
result if the states feel that the rules do not fit to the situations such as issues of 
economic advancement, then the rules will no longer be abided by.  
 
                                                 
7
 Maguire (2010) p. 21 
 
8 Ronnie D Lipschutz (2000-2002) p. 153 
 
9 Maguire (2010) P.22 
 
10
 Ibid. 
 
11 However, as it can be observed in Agenda 21 ‘more systematic consideration of environment’; 
integration has also been endorsed in principle 13 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, and 
Principle 4 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. Also see Voigt 51, below. 
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The idea of this statement is also implicated in the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity (here in after CBD); for example, in articles: 5, 7, 8, and 10 whereby all of 
these provisions are introduced as “as far as possible and appropriate”. Therefore, 
forest-rich developing countries may argue that it is not appropriate for them (I will 
discuss this in detail in chapter 3). The principle of state sovereignty is also contained in 
CBD preamble
12
, article 3
13
, and article 15
14
. From the dimension of sovereignty as 
envisaged in this convention and elsewhere in this text, she is not mistaken when 
Bragdon says, “International law clearly emerged and developed unaware of and 
seemingly unaffected by global environmental interdependence”15 This tend to absolve 
states when they seem generally proved unwilling to grant their protective rights to 
forests in their exercise of power over their environment. Hence, sovereignty poses 
insurmountable obstacle to protection of forests.  
 
Nonetheless, this shall not be construed as saying international law pertaining to 
protection of the environment is irrelevant to protection of forests. This is because; in 
international law the current concept of protection and utilization of (forests) resources 
necessitated the redefinition of sovereignty itself and mandated its exercise with a must 
responsibility. 
16
 This means that the freedom of states to utilize the forest resources 
within their national jurisdiction according to their national interests is now being 
challenged. 
 
                                                 
12Reaffirming that States have Sovereign rights over their own biological resources 
  
13 Article 3  Principle 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international   
law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, 
and the  responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.  
 
14 CBD Article 15 (1) 
 
15 Bragdon H. Susan (1992), P.381 
 
16 Birnie (2009) P.192 
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2.1.1 Sovereignty as Responsibility to Protect Forests in the ‘no-harm rule’ 
Environment in general is a common asset; this has the implication that the 
management of state’s own domestic environment in which forests are found is a matter 
of international concern independently of transnational effects. This triggers the 
individual state’s community obligation i.e. obligation towards all the other members of 
international community which requires the individual state to observe. Inferentially, 
the rules of the ‘no- harm rule’ which found their origin in the principle of good 
neighborliness are implied. 
 
This conveys the message that the sovereign rights of states to exploit their forest 
resources as per their national law and policies can be conditioned by other treaty law 
and other principles of international environmental law such as customary international 
law (CIL). The CIL as defined in Article 38 of the statute of International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), which arises from behavior of states towards each other with some sense 
of obligation (opinio-juris) binds even the third state i.e., a state which is not party to a 
treaty. 
 
Furthermore, while some may argue that countries have a right to do whatever they 
want with their resources, the case of forests is a unique one. The biodiversity, the clean 
air and water produced by rainforests are not exclusive within national borders. The 
clean air from the Amazon, for example, does not stay locked in within its national 
borders, but spreads out to and benefits the world as a whole. Thus forests differ from 
national resources such as mineral or oil deposits, in that it is a common resource. 
While each country has a right to develop its own industries, it can only do so within 
the limits of not interfering with the rights of other countries.  
 
This principle which dictates that countries can only develop to the extent that they do 
not harm other nations was outlined in Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, established in London in 1972, 
which stipulated that if certain countries condone the dumping of waste into the ocean, 
other countries may take multilateral action to punish the offending country. 
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Forests have been proved to have the status of shared natural resources
17
. Consistent 
with this, in the approaches to achieve sound environmental protection, greater 
knowledge and understanding of the biosphere and its components is of substantial 
importance
18
. Environmental problems have also known to have international 
dimensions.
19
 This pressured international community to take holistic approach in 
response to such multilateral environmental problems
20
. According to Humphreys 
(1996, P.26) forests use has been internationalized; therefore, forests should be re-
defined in terms of their functions including their global functions such as maintaining 
biological diversity, functioning as carbon sinks, serving as wildlife habitat, home for 
millions of indigenous forest peoples and providing them with livelihood.  
 
From the international dangers posed to the environment, climate change condition 
shares significant portion. It is considered as one of the issues involving shared natural 
resources
21
. Among multiple functions of forests, the use of forests as carbon sinks, and 
hence mitigating global climate change is the main one. Hence, by a necessary 
implication forests attract important shares in shared natural resources. This generates 
the direct application of international regulation of shared natural resources to forests. 
Without international regulations; shared natural resources; forests in particular, are 
vulnerable to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ becoming depleted or exhausted as each 
State seeks to maximize its own benefit by exploiting the resources.
22
  
 
States should cooperate in the conservation, management, and restoration of natural 
resources that occur in areas under the jurisdiction of one in (case of forests), or more 
than one State treating the natural system as one.
23
  
                                                 
17
 Ibid, P. 193 
 
18
  Shared Resources: Issues of governance Eds. IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper number 72  
 
19
 Ibid. 
 
20
 Ibid. 
 
21
 Ibid. 
 
22
 Ibid. 
 
23
 Ibid. 
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Another reason behind the assumption of forests as shared natural resources lies in the 
current view of societies about forests. As opposed to earlier thinking, the present 
understanding of society about forests is dominated by the view that forests are 
biologically rich but highly sensitive to depletion with limited capability of 
regeneration.
24
  
 
On the ground, there are countless lobbies and financial supports for advocating 
protection of forests by members of the international community including the UN 
members. It is also noted that forests’ important biological wealth is in the canopy, not 
in the soil
25
; and hence intensive exploitation alters them in to non-renewable 
resources
26
. The destruction of forests in such a way has a potential of jeopardizing the 
biodiversity, and the climate system. Fail to take action, we will fail to protect the 
biodiversity and stabilize our climate system. The scientific information is legally 
relevant and supported in treaties: 
 
The 1991 Convention on Trans-boundary Environmental Impact Assessment, the 2003 
Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment, UNEP’S EIA Goals and principles, 
CBD article14, article 3 and 8 of the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty, Principle 17 of the Rio declaration, and other legal instruments. 
Accordingly, “Science counsels that these resources should be conserved and managed 
to sustain a variety of commodity and non commodity uses”.27  
 
Therefore, forests have come to be conceived as valuable bio-reserves, extractive 
reserves, and carbon sinks
28
. This fairly contributes to and consolidates the embedded 
assumption in forests as useful shared natural resources. Furthermore, the threat to 
forests by accelerating deforestation (i.e., a permanent decrease in forest cover) and 
                                                 
 
24
  Tarlock (1997) P. 3  
  
25
 Donald R. Perry ( 1990) PP. 25-29 
 
 
26
 Cheryle S. Silver & Ruth S. Defries (1990) P. 120 
 
27
  Tarlock (1997) P. 3 
 
28
 Ibid, P. 4 
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forest degradation (i.e., a quality decrease related to factors like vegetation layer, fauna, 
and soil, or the loss of carbon stocks on remaining forest land) by forest-rich sovereign 
states, among others, led to the recognition of this world wide causes and effects 
globally.
29
 This also, arguably, extends to forests, the rank of global shared resources 
and propels its protection accordingly.  
 
The 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in its article 3 stipulates:  
In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more countries each state must 
co-operate on the basis of a system of information and prior consultation in order to 
achieve optimum use of such resources without causing damage to the legitimate 
interest of others. This article along with the UN General Assembly resolution 1973 
(Resolution 3129 XXVIII) and other soft laws pertaining to protection of forests could 
help striking a balance between national and international interests in forests.  
 
Currently, a number of principles signaling an increase in recognition of forests as 
shared resources which entails shared responsibility are emerging. These principles 
along with the customary international laws such as the ‘no-harm rule’ undermine the 
power of sovereignty and can serve as cornerstones in forming international forest law.  
 
However, Tarlock observes that “classic international law precludes the development of 
effective direct international legal restraints because it effectively shields internal 
policies, such as natural resource management decisions from external standards 
regardless of the international spillover”30 But this does not mean that the present 
international legal system is quite about it. It is arguably believed that international law 
is currently playing its role and making greatest contribution by setting rules, principles 
and standards which can influence and reinforce both domestic and international 
conservation policies. These include setting basis for international and domestic 
sanctions as standard of action against the adoption of destructive national forest 
policies. 
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Birnie (2009) posit that sovereignty does not out rule customary international and treaty 
laws protecting forests while limiting sovereignty.
31
 They further argue that principle of 
permanent sovereignty does not preclude the protection of forest resources within a 
state’s territory as common concern.32 They do not, however, undermine the concept of 
sovereignty holding central position in rights and duties of states. In fact I also agree 
with the importance of sovereignty principle as the norm that puts a state at equal 
footing with other states in the world arena. Its enunciation in Stockholm principle 21, 
Rio principle 2, and articles 3, and 15 of CBD also exemplifies this. 
 
Schrijver puts “It is clear that sovereignty has become pervaded with environmental 
concerns”.33 This sentence can be construed as prove of prevalence of concerns for 
protection of forests along with states sovereignty. Hence, in context of sovereignty 
over forest resources in the territory of a state, sovereignty can be perceived as both 
privilege and responsibility. Thus, state sovereignty under the general circumstances 
vests states with authority to value their freedom to do as they please with their own 
forests.
34
 At some specific situations, for example, when a state’s exploitation of its 
forest resources endanger the rights of other states, however, an obligation to take 
appropriate measures to prevent or minimize significant harm is imposed upon them by 
law.
35
 The general principles under Rio Principle 2 (Stockholm Principle 21) indicate 
global community’s right to interfere when one state policy affects interests of other 
nations.  
 
This implies the recognition that in the event of national activities endangering the wale 
fare of citizens outside national boundaries, the global community has the right to enact 
policies restricting the destructive behavior of individual states. In my understanding, 
the reason for the international community’s involvement is that, reports on the negative 
                                                 
31
 Birnie (2009) PP. 191-192 
 
32
 Ibid, P.192 
 
33
 Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 250 In: Birnie (2009) P. 192 
 
34
 Birnie (2009) P. 193 
  
35
 Ibid. 
 21 
impacts of various developmental schemes of forest-rich developing states on global 
environment is undisputed.  
 
This is why the concept of ‘sustainable development’ has been widely discussed by 
many environmental legal scholars as the best resolution. Given this, it holds true that 
the international community is noticing these schemes being employed under the norm 
of sovereignty of states which infers that although such schemes are done with in a 
border of a particular state, the international community is starting to feel its interests in 
a healthy and safe environment are threatened.  
 
Thus, interference with a country’s national issues regarding the management of its 
forests is a norm allowed by the rules of the ‘no-harm rule’ as enshrined under the 
above Rio and Stockholm principles. Under these rules, it seems fair to assume states 
freedom of exploiting forest resources in their territory as a general rule; whereas, the 
interference by the global community may be assumed as the “no- harm rule”- i.e. the 
principle of good neighborliness for the common good of all.  
 
Consistent with this, (Brunnee, 1996, p.309) observes that the interference with states 
sovereignty over forest resources in their national jurisdiction has to be generated only 
when the manner in which these states exploit their forests affect the interests of others. 
This is indeed a sensitive issue which requires the most delicate negotiations among 
states. 
 
My argument is, the ‘no-harm rule’ does not only recognize the international 
community’s interference with states internal forests management, but it also 
acknowledges the sovereignty norm as a right giving norm to states’ exploitation of 
their forests; in fact, only to the extent that this exploitation does not affect others 
environment. I indicated that the case of forests is a unique one. 
 
Therefore, if a country’s developmental efforts do harm to the environment shared by 
citizens elsewhere, as it can be the case in forests exploitation, then this generates to the 
international community, the right to demand behavioral change from the ‘polluting’ 
state. This in turns has the legal repercussion which enjoins a state with a duty to abide 
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by the world community’s demand. In summary, the application of the ‘no-harm rule’ is 
that deforestation and forest degradation cause harm to other states; for example, by 
aggravating changes in climatic conditions and disturbing biodiversity. Therefore, states 
are under obligation to refrain from such harm but not from cutting down forests. 
 
There, the bottom line in the concept of the ‘no-harm rule’ is, it is not the forests as 
resources confined within the limits of a state which qualify sovereignty but the uses of 
forests which scale up forest decline and pose threat to the international community. In 
other words, the limitation of sovereignty is not an impediment to states as owners of 
forest resources, but when its uses affect the rights of others, it is. 
 
2.1.2 The Human Rights Repercussions of Protection of Forests in State 
Sovereignty  
The Human Rights implication of protection of forests is that in Human Rights; the 
issue of forests was impliedly addressed. In this context, the rights of people to a 
healthy and quality environment pertains to protection of forests. Accordingly, if the 
rules are to be amended in such a way; it does not preclude the reference of the rules to 
protection of forests. Today, protection of forests right is no less important than 
economic or social rights: “Many human rights are suited to being applied from an 
ecological perspective, whether those rights are political, civil, social, economic or 
cultural, and whether they are exercised individually or collectively.”36  
 
This paves the way to provide criteria to properly enforce the obligation derived from a 
decent, healthy, or sound environment. This includes privileging environmental quality 
giving a value equal to and comparable status to other rights such as development 
rights. Civil and political rights are necessary preconditions for mobilizing 
environmental issues, and making claims to protect the environment effective. 
Nonetheless, the sovereignty principle in the context of forest-rich sovereign states 
undermines these rights when it allows exploitation of forests as the states see fit. 
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Accordingly, the first victims of climate changes or any other dangers posed to the 
environment due to forests exploitation are local peoples and the citizens of the states.
 37
 
For example, the decline of forests due to deforestation and forest degradation affects 
the poor forest peoples, more specifically and immediately. The IACHR and CIDH 
have interpreted the rights to life, health and property to afford protection from 
environmental destruction and unsustainable development.
38
  
 
Collective rights empower peoples to determine how to develop their environment and 
natural resources such as forests and its management. The African Commission of 
Human Rights held that the peoples´ right to a general satisfactory environment 
favorable to their development
39
 imposes an obligation on the State to take reasonable 
measures “to prevent ecological degradation and secure ecologically sustainable 
development.”40 In addition, the peoples´ right to the best attainable standard of health41 
included: 
Ordering independent scientific monitoring of threatened environments, 
requiring and publishing environmental and social impacts studies prior to 
any major industrial development, undertaking appropriate monitoring and 
providing information to those communities.
42
  
 
However, due to the concept of state sovereignty which states value as their freedom to 
do away with the resources confined in their territory as they see fit, in majority of the 
developing countries, particularly in forest-rich sovereign nations, environmental 
impact assessments, arguably, may not be undertaken in practice or at least do not 
reverse a planned project to take effect. This seriously infringes the rights of forest 
dwellers, and the effects also transcend the boundary and interfere with other states’ 
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interest in protection of the environment. A relevant international case with this is the 
international obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment: the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) case concerning Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project. In 
this case ICJ found: “The project's impact upon […] the environment is of necessity a 
key issue […] the Parties together should look afresh at the effects on the environment 
of the operation of the Gabcikovo power plant”43. 
 
Weeramantry-the former vice president of ICJ; in his separate opinion, affirms: 
“It is thus the correct formulation of the right to development that that right does not 
exist in the absolute sense, but is relative always to its tolerance by the environment.”44 
Weeramantry further suggests: 
The right to development and the right to environmental protection 
are principles currently forming part of the corpus of international 
law. They could operate in collision with each other unless there was 
a principle of international law which indicated how they should be 
reconciled. That principle is the principle of sustainable development 
which, according to this opinion, is more than a mere concept, but is 
itself a recognized principle of contemporary international law.
45
  
 
In relation to the protection of the environment, he convincingly demonstrates: 
[It] is […] a vital part of contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is 
a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to health 
and the right to life itself. It is scarcely necessary to elaborate on this, 
as damage to the environment can impair and undermine all the human 
rights spoken of in the Universal Declaration and other human rights 
instruments.
46
  
 
Therefore, states (including developed countries) must respect this core of international 
value from which no countries, no matter how great its economy and military strength, 
may deviate.  
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Weeramantry posits: 
“There is a duty lying upon all members of the community to preserve the integrity and 
purity of the environment.”47 He also believes that: 
I believe a distinction must be made between litigation involving 
issues inter partes and litigation which involves issues with an erga 
omnes connotation. When we enter the arena of obligations which 
operate erga omnes rather than inter parties, rules based on individual 
fairness and procedural compliance may be inadequate. […] 
International environmental law will need to proceed beyond weighing 
the rights and obligations of parties within a closed compartment of 
individual State self-interest, unrelated to the global concerns of 
humanity as a whole.
48
  
 
In this opinion, it is possible to infer that Weeramantry gives the duty to preserve the 
integrity and purity of the environment erga omnes character.
49
 Therefore, developed 
countries should need assurances of openness, transparency, and that the fund to 
developing states will be used in appropriate manner so that the environment will not be 
damaged, the forests will not be destroyed, and the community will not be affected 
while a state exercises its sovereignty. Birnie (2009) uphold this idea; they state: 
While obligations of global environmental responsibility may have an 
erga omnes partes character, in the sense that they are owed to all states 
acting through collective institutions of treaty supervision, in the 
Nuclear Test Cases the ICJ was unsympathetic to the notion of an actio 
popularis allowing high seas freedoms to be enforced by any state, and 
it did not follow its earlier dicta.
50
  
 
This leads one to holding the view that this decision does not deny the difference made 
by Weeramantry. The ICJ was unsympathetic with the possibility of litigation through 
actio popularis on issues which involves an erga omnes character. Yet, it does not deny 
the erga omnes character of the obligation lying upon the international community to 
preserve the integrity of the environment. Neither does it affect the nature of the 
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coherent cooperation that the international community deems to pay attention when the 
global environment, forest in particular, is threatened. 
 
The gist of this argument is that ICJ was unsympathetic to actio popularis when global 
environment is under threat. Nevertheless, it maintained the ergaomnes character of the 
right and duty all states have in common in protecting the environment, (forests) in the 
context of this paper. The realization of this obligation that is included within the 
human rights to a healthy environment could provide a coherent answer to the 
international community with reference to forest protection. States should not recognize 
as lawful, forest regulation based on unsustainable levels of its utility. 
 
States should collectively bring it to an end by lawful means. This concept of 
sustainable utility is echoed in sustainable development as a normative frame work 
which in turn is coupled with sustainable environmental protection
51
. However, it does 
not explicitly include protection of forests in the context of human rights. Nevertheless, 
forests, due to their climate change mitigation capacity, represent our health, the quality 
of our life, and the living space for generations including the generations not yet born. 
 
To achieve sustainability in the quality of our life, and to realize the right to a healthy 
environment obligation which is included within the human rights instruments, 
protection of forests is a must requirement that forest-rich sovereign states must 
observe. Otherwise, if states because of sovereignty principle continue to exploit forests 
as they see fit; this may aggravate climate change, and hence suffocation may affect 
human health, and endanger forest biodiversity on which humans rely on in many ways 
to earn their living. This will definitely interfere with, and undermine all the human 
rights enshrined under the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
other human rights documents. 
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2.1.3 Important Limitations  
The limitations on states sovereignty argument dictate the limitations on hitherto 
exclusive state sovereignty (abuse of rights or territory) to forest destruction. This 
indicates that national forest management policies and laws will no longer be an 
exclusive domestic matter of states. The principle of state sovereignty can be rebutted 
by customary international law and by conventions where a state enters into an 
international treaty regime on the environment that is: 
 
 By way of state agreeing to international treaty or national law to 
protect its physical environment; 
 
 Sovereignty here equates with independence and equality; and 
hence the rule of international law binding upon the state 
emanates from its own free will as expressed in conventions (by 
way of customary international to states non-party to any of such 
conventions).  
 
This exemplifies the increase in the internationalization, and to certain extent 
globalization of forests and its protection. Bragdon is optimistic about this when 
eloquently addresses the political boundaries as having little or no meaning with respect 
to harm done to the environment
52
. That is to mean the interwoven international 
problems pose difficulties to the national sovereignty oriented governance. Therefore, 
international phenomenon like forest depletion demands global approach to its 
protection. However, there are arguments by non legal scholars. They argue that it is 
only the international legal scholars who tend to believe that international law affects 
states conduct and that it can usefully be deployed to address serious environmental 
problems among nations. And for others venturing outside the comfortable community 
of international legal scholars, that belief is challenged and remains a matter of 
discussion.  
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However, the international environmental legal system is quite not like that. It does not 
also imply that it remains almost entirely without effect and thus it has simply become a 
debating stage. As states though sovereign, by their own interest and or by customary 
international law bound by conventions; there are such legal systems as the ‘no-harm 
rules’, the World summit on sustainable development (WSSD), the convention on 
biological diversity (CBD), the frame work convention on climate change (UNFCCC) 
etc., are all there to help prevent such acts of individual states violating treaties and 
customs. 
 
Moreover, the adoption of international agreement alters the national legal and policy 
instruments for it compels a country to adjust its laws and policies accordingly. This 
also indicates the limitation on the state’s right and entails responsibility. The second 
part of the 1992 Rio Forest Principles 1(a), mandates states to think beyond 
consequences within a state boundaries and consider all negative consequences to ensue 
from their action. The states mandate under this principle is that states “do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction”.53  
 
This principle confirms the traditional normative framework which states that nations 
have sovereign rights to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own national law 
and policies. It however subjects them to the obligation not to cause injury to others. 
Overall it indicates the existence of international duties along with domestic privileges. 
This qualify sovereignty; i.e., with its objective of conserving and protecting the natural 
environment, it infringes the rights of states to deal with their natural resources in which 
they sought to achieve their national exigencies. 
 
Maguire suggests the sovereign rights of states and the obligations to ensue thereto, as 
divergent but one always standing along the path of the other with their interaction 
seemingly a confusing picture
54
. Her argument seems that state sovereignty could not be 
served as justification states sought not to comply with their duties under forest 
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protections when the later is at stake. True; no doubt, if sovereignty lies along the line 
of development of negotiations pertaining to protection of forests, it hampers such 
agreements from having potential to influence states behavior. 
 
Humphreys, well notes this saying “sovereignty is a legal fiction which has always been 
compromised by transnational economic and social forces with assertions of 
sovereignty serving to insulate the state from the international environmental effects of 
its policies”.55 Mickelson also observes the difficulty of changing the long lasted 
attitude on sovereignty over forests and hindrances in side-stepping it to materialize 
laws on protection of forests. He argues: 
An essential difficulty that arises in the context of developing a forest 
convention is that of avoiding the perception that such an agreement 
constitutes an infringement of sovereignty. In fact if an instrument on 
forests is qualitatively different from previous international instruments 
in the environmental area it is precisely because its potential impact on 
sovereignty over resources appears to be much more direct.
56
  
 
Indeed, the agreement bears potential impact on sovereignty. Nevertheless, the impact 
should be interpreted positively. This is because if states use state sovereignty as shields 
to the ends of their national exigencies as Humphreys above movingly suggested, their 
obligation to the challenges currently facing the international community; namely: 
global forest decline, loss of biological diversity, and above all, the pressing issue of 
changes in climatic condition, will never be complied with. Consequently, sovereignty 
continues to risk the environment, threat species, aggravate changes on climatic 
condition, and disturb biodiversity. Therefore, striving to create a binding international 
legal instrument with objectives in protection of forests is a rather best option that limits 
sovereignty and allows states to make aggressive response to halt losses of our real 
resources.  
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2.1.4 State Responsibility 
The international law provision which prohibits countries doing harm to each other has 
now become customary rule of international law
57
. These customary rules are 
reinforced by many principles observed as customary obligations
58
, and treaties such as 
UNFCCC
59
. The prohibitions under these rules entail State responsibility. Sompong 
observes that: 
The current notion of State responsibility is a comprehensive regime 
of the law of obligations, covering general principles of states’ 
international responsibility, including primary rules that establish all 
types of internationally wrongful acts attributable to a State and 
secondary rules that flow as a legal consequence from a State’s breach 
of an international obligation, regardless of its origin”.60 
 
Impacts of global forest decline because of deforestation and forest degradation by 
forest-rich countries fall under this rule. The main focus of international environmental 
law today is on the prevention and control of environmental harm. 
61
 Sustainable and 
wise use of natural resources and ecosystem among which forests form significant share 
is also subject of its protection. To ensure the realization of its protection, compliance 
by States and enforcement of the rules, international law puts responsibility on States.
62
 
Accordingly, the concept of the State responsibility encompasses wider range of 
enforcement of international obligations pertaining to protection of the environment and 
prevention of transnational environmental damages.  
 
A famous case between the United States and Canada
63
 concerning the activities of the 
Canadian smelter located in Trail, British Colombia, for example, is an important 
element of State responsibility. In this dispute, the arbitral tribunal asserted a general 
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duty on the part of a State to protect other States from injurious acts by individuals 
within its jurisdiction. The arbitral tribunal recognized the responsibility of a State for 
the acts of non-State actors as well as those of the State or its organs. 
 
The tribunal found that “‘[…] no State has the right to use or permit the use of its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or 
the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury 
is established by clear and convincing evidence’”.64 The Trail Smelter arbitration is the 
first case of its kind to set foundations for discussions of State responsibility in 
environmental concerns. After the Trail Smelter case, a general duty to avoid trans-
boundary injury is again asserted by ICJ in the 1949 Corfu Channel
65
 case. 
 
In this case ICJ found that it is “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its 
territory to be used contrary to the rights of other States”.66 The decisions rendered in 
these two cases find relevance to protection of forests in that the exploitation of forests 
by a State in an arbitrary manner is against the law that forbids State’s use or its 
permission of the use of its territory contrary to the rights of other States.  
 
In international law, states are responsible for violations of international environmental 
law and are obliged to compensate the indirectly or directly affected states for the 
damage caused.
67
 This rule forms the gist of the law of state responsibility. There are 
also rules that provide authoritative statement of the existing law
68
. Such rules are 
codified in 2001 by the International Law Commission (ILC, “Draft Articles on 
Prevention of Trans-boundary Harm from Hazardous Activities”). These rules are in 
some cases reiterations of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
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principles outlawing trans-boundary environmental injury, for example, principle 2 
which states:  
States have, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant 
to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or 
of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. (Emphasis 
added).  
 
The rules developed by the ILC have reflected this inter alia in its article 3.
69
 This rule 
has legal bearings as evidenced in the legal language it employs. Therefore, they can 
serve as useful tools to examine the conditions and consequences of damages inflicted 
by a state on other states. This should include establishing responsibility for climate 
change damages caused by global forest decline due to deforestation and forest 
degradation by the forest owner states.  
 
2.1.5 Trans-boundary Cooperation  
The rule of international law that calls on states to cooperate on environmental matters 
is usually stated in general terms. Under UN Charter, article 1 (3) provides that “To 
achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, […]”. This general obligation can also 
include some specific commitments. These incorporate relevant provisions enunciated 
inter alia under ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention of Trans-boundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities; namely: the duty to take appropriate measures to prevent or 
minimize the risk of trans-boundary harm or to minimize its effects (Article 3); the 
obligation to cooperate to its effect (Article 4); the duty to notify and consult the states 
likely to be affected by the harm with a view to agreeing with measures to minimize or 
prevent the risk of harm (Articles 6 and 7).  
 
The provisions are also delineated under the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development Principles: 2; 7 and 14; and 19 respectively. Birnie (2009) consider the 
basic proposition that states must co-operate in avoiding adverse effects on their 
neighbors through a system of notification, consultation, impact assessment, and 
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negotiation appears generally to be endorsed by relevant jurisprudence, the declarations 
of international bodies, and the works of ILC.
70
  
 
They believe it also enjoys important relevance in state practice, based on Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project, and the Nuclear Test Advisory Opinion cases.
71
 Since Birnie 
(2009) state that an obligation for states to cooperate with each other to curb trans-
boundary environmental risks is widely recognized, this obligation does not preclude 
global forest decline; but rather have direct legal bearings on it. Because the obligation 
to cooperate, notify and consult is considered to be obligation of customary law and the 
forests being shared natural resources triggers accountability of the forest-rich states to 
the international community.  
 
Birnie (2009) eminently stress: “It is beyond serious argument that states are required 
by international law to regulate and control activities within their territory or subject to 
their jurisdiction or control that pose a significant risk of global or trans-boundary 
pollution or environmental harm”.72 Consistent with this, forest-rich countries can be 
held accountable if they refuse to co-operate in trying to prevent and stop over 
exploitation of forest resources in their respective jurisdiction. 
 
Article 5 of the CBD also puts on states the duty to cooperate, directly or through 
international organizations concerning areas beyond national jurisdiction. Though this 
seems too general to generate liability for trans-boundary harm, it shall not be served by 
states as lacunae to disregard the possible trans-boundary consequences of their actions. 
Because Article 14
73
 of the same convention in particular, mandates parties, albeit 
qualified with ‘as far as possible and appropriate’, to make impact assessment and 
minimize its effects. 
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2.2 International (National) Approaches to Protection of Forests 
The climate summit in Copenhagen, December 2009, was arguably, the first of its type 
for all states, big and small, to practically get together and discuss forest issues. If I am 
to borrow one more statement from one of my environmental law subject professors-
Christina Voigt lectured it as “the first conference of new world order; it meant Europe 
was sidelined, developing states have an extremely strong voice”. Though it ended as 
“disappointing”, the summit has helped in setting of parameters for protection of forests 
in national policies and laws.  
 
These national approaches should also be in consonant with international policies in 
protection of forests. Accordingly, numerous sovereign states are now preparing their 
forest protection projects. Nevertheless, the lack of agreement seems to obscure what 
the collaboration between developed and developing countries is trying to achieve. 
However, this does not mean that there are no rules on protection of forests and hence 
its issues remain in vain. When states violate the primary rules pertaining to protection 
of forests such as the rules under treaties: namely CBD, UNFCC, and other customary 
international laws; the secondary rules under which states both nationally and 
internationally assume responsibility shall apply. Such rules include the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility which requires states to place national 
environmental problems in a global context. 
 
2.2.1 The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility  
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), agreed on at the 
1992 Earth Summit requires both industrialized and developing countries to place 
national problems in a global context and to ensure that national activities do not cause 
any global or regional damage. This approach addresses both the national and the 
international factors behind deforestation and forest degradation and ties national 
sovereignty to global common interests. I.e., under this principle states are 
internationally responsible for the consequences of their act of deforestation and forest 
degradation; and their sovereignty does not absolve them from accountability under 
international environmental law.  
 35 
2.2.2 The Main Aspects of the Principle 
State responsibility is clearly enshrined under the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility. Hence, duty to put a stop to the deterioration of the global 
forests is a common responsibility of the sovereign states. Within the meaning of this 
principle, however, it is erroneous to assume that international law always treats all 
states equally. 
 
True, it is critical that the community of sovereign states arrives at a common goal in 
protection of forests and participates effectively in its achievement. Yet the 
international community encounters increasing disparities between and within nations. 
For example, the worsening of poverty, in most parts of the developing countries, puts 
significant restraint on states’ crafting a common legal platform for environmental 
measures in general - UNFCCC art.4(7). Therefore the main aspect of the principle 
resides in defining equitable balance between developing and developed states by 
setting differences in environmental standards for the two nations in discharging their 
obligations; and the obligation to cooperate i.e., transfer of resources and technology as 
a solidarity assistance the developed states owe under the law – Rio Declaration 
Principle 7. 
 
2.2.3 Common Responsibility 
The 1992 Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) and the 1992 Biological Diversity 
Convention (CBD) in their preamble acknowledge the earth’s climate change and 
conservation of biological diversity respectively and equate their protection with a 
common concern. Protection of forests has significant role to play in avoiding adverse 
effects on these common concerns. The concept of common responsibility in common 
but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) in relation to protection of forests suggests 
equity consideration. Accordingly, to qualify a state’s over exploitation of its forests 
because forest decline raises question of “common concern” (climate change or loss of 
biodiversity); the other international community of states’ rights should also be linked 
to responsibility which is rooted in the principle of co-operation.
74
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In other words, forest decline should not be conceptualized as the sole responsibility of 
forest- rich developing states. The consequences of forest destruction by forest-rich 
sovereign states affect all nation states would mean the protection should receive 
concerted efforts; that means that developed and developing countries share the burden 
of halting forest decline. Now it can be argued that the principle of common concern in 
CBDR not only vests international community with rights to demand forest-rich 
countries compliance with the obligations they assumed under international law, but 
also generates possibly, corresponding responsibilities to all other concerned states as 
well.
75
  
 
However, the principle of CBDR itself is only morally binding (authoritative 
statement); its legal content as binding customary international law is disputed.
76
 
Forests themselves being common concerns also necessitate their protection as common 
responsibility. Sands, eminently notes that “the legal interest which a state has can be 
translated in to a legal right of equitable access to, and use of, a particular 
environmental resource, and a legal responsibility to prevent harm to it”.77  
 
In the forests context this would mean that concerted financial and technological 
assistance from developed countries is a necessary harmony of interests with forest-rich 
countries to forgo the exploitation of forests. This enables both developed and 
developing states equally motivated by understanding of such mutual self interest, and 
work in tandem in pursuit of this common goal. The UNFCCC Article 4 (1, (c), 4 (3) 
and Rio Principle 7 exemplify this. With the absence of this solidarity assistance as 
responsibility of the developed states; the overriding issue of poverty alleviation is a 
compelling reason for the forest owner developing states not to prioritize protection of 
forests (UNFCCC Article 4(7), CBD Article 20(4), Agenda 21, C.17.2, etc. 
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On the first read of these provisions, however, one may assume protection of forests 
should be stopped until the poor forest nations become rich. Nevertheless, in protection 
of forests, given the threat to the world climate by deforestation and forest degradation 
among others, developing countries should not cite the provisions as licenses to do 
away with their responsibilities. Indeed, the provisions have indicated differentiation in 
responsibilities as I will discuss below. Nonetheless, “It was never intended to be a 
justification for allowing developing states to dump pollution on each other”78. Neither 
do the developed states’ obligations of cooperation enunciated under these provisions 
only necessary, but decisive and mandatory. Thus, international (environmental) law 
ties all states, big and small with common responsibility; in fact with differential 
treatments.  
 
2.2.4 Differentiated Responsibility 
Differences exist between sovereign states of the world. This is at least clearly standing 
in terms of economic advancements between nations of the world. The “war” against 
poverty eradication is the primary and overriding strategy of the forest-rich developing 
countries. On the other hand, combating deforestation and forest degradation to halt 
forest decline is a “common concern” of all states. Nevertheless, this use of 
environmental control should not prohibitively restrict the economic growth of the 
developing states. An equitable measure is therefore, the asymmetrical obligations for 
developed and developing countries which have become the norm in international 
environmental treaties.
79
 
 
Rajamani posits that “the notion of differentiated responsibility drives from both the 
differing contributions of States to climate change and the differing capacities of States 
to take remedial measures”.80 Accordingly differentiated responsibility places 
differentiated environmental standards on various states. Coherent with this, Birnie 
(2002) explain that developed countries historically have contributed much to changes 
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in climatic conditions. And they have greater technological and economic capacity in 
the process of correcting it.
81
 On the other hand, A.M Halvorssen (2006) argues that the 
contribution of developing countries to climate change has been insignificant; and thus, 
they have remained vulnerable to its impacts because of lack of resources to curb the 
problem.
82
 
 
Both Birnie, and A.M Halvorssen put major blame on developed states, and accordingly 
link them with primary responsibility to deal with the matter. Lower standards, and 
more favorable treatments have however been imposed on developing states also. 
Consistent with this, Rajamani
83
 lists important provisions of international 
environmental law dealing with such differential treatments: 
 provisions that differentiate between industrial and developing 
countries with respect to the central obligations contained in the 
treaty, such as emissions reduction targets and timetables;
84
  
 
  provisions that differentiate between industrial and developing 
countries with respect to implementation,
85
 such as delayed 
compliance schedules,
86
 permission to adopt subsequent base 
years,
87
 delayed reporting schedules,
88
 
 
 and softer approaches to non-compliance;89 and, provisions that 
grant assistance, inter alia, financial
90
 and technological.
91
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D.S Christopher
92
 also makes similar notes of the differential treatment provisions. 
Accordingly: 
An agreement can make differential substantive requirements;
93
 subject 
some parties to a more favorable compliance timetable; permit special 
defenses?
94
 make noncompliance, if not forgiven, overlooked;
95
 or afford 
qualified nations financial and technical contributions,
96
 or as a precondition 
for their own participation.
97
 
 
It now seems fair to assume that international environmental law can best play its role 
in protection of forests when introduced with differentiated responsibility. The 
responsibility is seen as more equitable and well acceptable for developing forest 
countries as well. This forest context differentiated responsibility implicates that there 
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should be some provisions need to exist and guide the financial and technological 
assistance from developed states to developing states.  
 
Equally important is that these provisions entitle the developed states to have a strong 
say on the manner of exploitation of forests by the forest-rich nations. Meanwhile, the 
provisions enable the developing states to renew their efforts in their commitment to 
protect the forests-common concern of nation states; and to observe the obligations they 
assumed under the law. 
 
Humphreys (2006)
98
 can be well credited on this. He broadly discusses: 
A framework of differentiated responsibilities could, in principle, 
allow for developed states to acknowledge an obligation to assist 
tropical countries through financial and technology transfers, in 
exchange for a commitment from tropical forest countries to 
acknowledge an obligation to conserve an agreed area of forests. It is 
possible that the Non-Legally Binding Institution (NLBI) 
negotiations could lead to a bargain whereby developing countries 
acknowledge the principle of technology transfer through the market, 
in exchange for which developed countries agree to create a fund 
made up of voluntary contributions so that technology can be 
transferred at prices that are discounted below market prices. 
 
This fairness element of negotiation has a possibility of leading the road from NLBI 
agreements to potential international forest regime. It simply becomes the crux of the 
matter in enhancing legitimacy and states’ adherence to its provisions. 
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3 International Treaty Regimes Applicable to Protection of Forests: 
Emergence of International Forest law 
Forests were one central topic of the 1992 UNCED. However, there has been no 
coherent international forest legal regime that has aimed at their protections. I.e. “[…] 
yet there is not binding international agreement on forests”.99 The instruments adopted 
to date are not hard law.
100
 In Rio, however, there have been conventions coming into 
existence on forests which are recently justifiably critical. These are conventions on 
forests for the sake of climate change, and loss of biodiversity. Protection of forests as 
global carbon cycle under UNFCCC, and for biodiversity conservation under CBD is 
the subjects of discussion in this chapter. 
 
Other than in these two treaties, today’s forest governance seems to remain as 
fragmented conglomerate of different conventions and forums. Brunnee, well 
summarize this saying “International forest law remains an underdeveloped area of 
law”101 Nevertheless, the intersection of consequences of forest decline with issues of 
biodiversity and changes in climatic conditions makes protection of forests not a matter 
of necessity, but obligation. Consequently conventions on biodiversity and climate 
change integrate forests and their protection into their portfolio. 
 
3.1 Protection of Forests in CBD 
Because of its specious- rich biosphere, protection of forests has become the core 
concern of biodiversity conservation. Forests are “central to global efforts to maintain 
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biological diversity”.102 The convention on biological diversity (CBD) acknowledges 
the human interferences which brought about decline in biodiversity, and demands 
alleviation of the causes at its sources. The CBD in its preamble states “Biological 
diversity is being significantly reduced by certain human activities” and that its 
conservation is a “common concern of mankind”. Giving biodiversity a status of 
‘common concern’ would mean a legitimization to put it under the protection of 
international legislation. 
 
For forest-rich developing countries this would have the implication that dealing with 
issues of forests (forest protection) is not just a matter of domestic jurisdiction. This is 
because forests play important role in maintaining biodiversity. This in turn, arguably, 
confers on forests the status of “common concern”. And I have suggested in chapter two 
that forests intersect with biodiversity conservation. Therefore, “although not concerned 
with forests per se, the Convention on Biological Diversity is or at least could be, of 
prime relevance to the development of forest law”.103  
 
It is a well accepted fact that forests are among the major habitats and foods on which 
biodiversity relies on for its survival. Thus, it is of crucial importance and critical 
necessity, granting forests, a protection of equal footing to biodiversity to hit the 
objectives of the convention. The objectives of CBD
104
 among others include, 
“conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the 
‘fair and equitable sharing of the benefits […]” These objectives though explicitly are 
about striking a balance between conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, or 
more broadly between developed and developing states; the phrase “sustainable use of 
its components” among others, impliedly forms a conceptual basis for the protection 
and sustainable use of forests. 
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This sustainability in forests context implies that the use of destructive practices and 
intensive technologies increase forest degradation thereby leading to declines in the 
economies and benefits of societies that they support. 
105
 It is thus, an effective tool of 
achieving forest sustainability; otherwise any unsustainable practice on forests can also 
have negative consequences on biodiversity. Pursuant to Article 5 of CBD: 
Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate, co-
operate with other Contracting Parties, directly or, where appropriate, 
through competent international organizations, in respect of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction and on other matters of mutual interest, for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. (Emphasis 
added). 
 
The importance of cooperation as laid down under this article does not only emphasize 
on areas beyond national jurisdiction but also on other matters of mutual interest to 
protect biodiversity. Here it triggers the application of cooperation to forests protection. 
Because as I indicated above under chapter two; mutual interest includes forests. CBD 
also includes in Article 8 (d), the promotion of natural habitat protection. Since the 
provision of Article 8 is about in-situ conservation i.e. in its natural place/environment; 
protection of forests shares the protections under this provision. 
 
As one eminent writer puts “Forests provide the most diverse sets of habitats for plants, 
[…]. Consequently, the maintenance of forest ecosystems is crucial to the conservation 
of biological diversity and degradation of forests has a dramatic impact on 
biodiversity”.106 Protection of forests is a critical issue as it proves important services to 
our environment including as habitats for biological diversity; yet, States “value their 
freedom ‘to do as they please with their own few remaining forests’”.107 CBD also 
maintain this concept of sovereignty in Article 3, and Article 15. I argue that 
nonetheless the convention can have strong influence on attempts to develop 
international forest law. As provided under many of the provisions of the CBD, states 
have duty to co-operate with each other on numerous counts.  
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For instance, Article 20 (1), imposes on all parties (including the forest-rich developing 
states), the obligation to ‘undertake’, in fact on the basis of their ‘capabilities’ to 
contribute finance and incentives for the implementation of the objectives. But this 
seems that those funded states arguably, will not have a big say because they do not 
contribute to the fund; that means there will not be a free ride without undertaking the 
obligation. Even those funded developing countries have to; within the meaning of 
Article 21 (2) subject themselves to a careful monitoring and evaluation on a regular 
basis. This is also one way of qualifying the sovereignty principle laid down under 
Articles 3 and 15 of the same convention. Birnie (2009) argue: 
Much of the success of the biodiversity convention in ensuring the 
responsible exercise of state sovereignty when identifying and using 
biological resource depends on the willingness of parties to fulfill their 
various duties under it to cooperate, especially on providing the finance, 
technology, and other forms of support required for successful 
operation.
108
  
 
Therefore, cooperation deems be given due regards. Apart from its provision as an 
specific obligatory requirement under Article 5, cooperation is further provided inter 
alia under: Article 9 (e) ex situ conservation i.e., outside of natural habitat conservation; 
Article 10 sustainable use of components of biological diversity; Article 12 (c) research 
in developing methods for conservation and sustainable use of biological resources; 
Article 13 public education and awareness on conservation and sustainable use.  
 
Most of these provisions including the specific Article 5 are, however, not hard law 
provisions, because they are introduced as, “as far as possible and as appropriate”. The 
language in a way refers i.e. “as possible”- related to the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’; “appropriate”- states have the choice of the means to 
achieve the objectives/optional. So forest- rich developing countries may argue that it is 
not appropriate for them to subject their sovereignty to the obligation they assumed 
under the convention. This might imply the responsibilities under the convention are 
dependent upon the situations in the respective states.  
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However, there must be a balancing as the forest-rich sovereign states cannot violate the 
convention with impunity. This is because; forests exploitation apart from threatening 
biodiversity impairs the overall quality of the environment.
109
 States having recognized 
such effects of environmental decline, entered into agreement on alleviating the 
problem have the implication that “by imposing obligations for protection of 
biodiversity, this treaty has shaped some of the contours of global forest law”110.  
 
3.1.1 Establishment of Protected Area 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), in its Article 2, deals with protected 
area as “a geographically defined area, which is designated or regulated and managed to 
achieve specific conservation objectives”. The need for protected area is given attention 
in the convention. In many of its provisions, the convention calls for the establishment 
of a system of protected areas or areas where special measures need to be taken to 
conserve biological diversity. Nonetheless, the call for protected areas does not give 
important place to forests protection explicitly.  
 
Moreover, the definition of protected area recently coined by IUCN 
111
: “A clearly 
defined geographical space, recognized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other 
effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated 
ecosystem services and cultural values”. Forests are not explicitly put in the explanation 
of this definition; nevertheless, the definition of forests in the context of forest protected 
areas is elaborated as the definition that draws on that of UNECE/FAO and adds 
interpretation from IUCN.  
 
Accordingly, the UNECE/FAO
112
 definition of forest is: 
Land with tree crown cover (or equivalent stocking level) of more than 
10 percent and area of more than 0.5 ha. The trees should be able to 
reach a minimum height of 5 m at maturity in situ. A forest may 
consist either of closed forest formations where trees of various storey 
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and undergrowth cover a high proportion of the ground, or open forest 
formations with a continuous vegetation cover in which tree crown 
cover exceeds 10 percent. Young natural stands and all plantations 
established for forestry purposes which have yet to reach a crown 
density of 10percent or tree height of 5 m are included under forest, as 
are areas normally forming part of the forest area which are 
temporarily un stocked as a result of human intervention or natural 
causes but which are expected to revert to forest. Includes: Forest 
nurseries and seed orchards that constitute an integral part of the 
forest; forest roads, cleared tracts, firebreaks and other small open 
areas; forest in national parks, nature reserves and other protected 
areas, such as those of special scientific, historical, cultural or spiritual 
interest; windbreaks and shelterbelts of trees with an area of more than 
0.5 ha and width of more than 20 m; plantations primarily used for 
forestry purposes, including rubber wood plantations and cork oak 
stands. Excludes: Land predominantly used for agricultural practices. 
Other wooded land: Land either with a crown cover (or equivalent 
stocking level) of 5–10 percent of trees able to reach a height of 5 m at 
maturity in situ; or a crown cover (or equivalent stocking level) of 
more than 10 percent of trees not able to reach a height of 5 m at 
maturity in situ (e.g., dwarf or stunted trees); or with shrub or bush 
cover of more than 10 percent. 
 
As per the IUCN policy guide lines, even a land being restored to natural forest should 
be counted as protected area if the principal management objective is the maintenance 
and protection of biodiversity and associated cultural values. Therefore, forests are well 
fit to and are part and parcel of the definition and in consequence, should receive 
important legal protection. 
 
3.2 The Climate Change Legal Regime 
In Protection of forests under CBD, though importance of forest protection is of 
immense significance, I have seen that forest issues have thus far played a subordinated 
role. In the climate change process, however, despite differences of interests among 
nations, there exist, convergence of views in particular the current approaches to 
protection of forests for climate sake. Birnie (2009, P. 356) characterize issues such as 
deforestation, protection of natural habitats and ecosystems, sea-level rise and 
sovereignty over natural resources as important causative factors of problem of carbon 
sinks.  
 
Consequently, they view the traditional sectoral approach to the problems of climate 
change as inappropriate and hence, propose a holistic approach to this interwoven and 
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global character of changes in climatic condition. This is because as Voigt eminently 
notes the change in climatic condition occupies the centre of the structure of modern 
societies; it goes to the heart of industries, economies and global relationships.
113
 The 
preamble of the UNFCCC itself recognizes the changes in climate conditions and its 
adverse effects as a common concern of international community. Though states 
reached consensus, and their agreement attracted universal attention; the 1992 
UNFCCC has encountered deep differences of opinions from the parties in reference to 
measures to be taken and assignment of responsibility for addressing the problem.
114
  
 
The developed states themselves do not have similar stand on measures to be taken in 
dealing with climate change. 
115
 Among the complicated problems Voigt eloquently 
addresses “Unprecedented questions of global equity, such as fairness in cost and 
responsibility sharing and differences in vulnerability and social aspects, [as linking] 
climate change to a multitude of interlinked problems of late modern society”.116 This 
can be stated as the main hindrance to the concerted efforts states need to undergo in 
addressing climate change problem.  
 
Nevertheless, the state’s boundary and the sovereignty issues are irrelevant with 
reference to changes in climatic condition. On this score also Voigt movingly notes, 
“The challenge of global climate change exceeds time and space limitations that 
previously defined singular problems of the world community and their respective legal 
responses”.117 This is envisaged in recently held various global climate change accords 
which include forests as the matter of core concerns in their agenda. 
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Accordingly, Forest decline and loss has recently become big issues in climate change 
talks as a vital interest of governments, international organizations, NGOs, and other 
constituencies. Putting forests under international legal regime however, has proved to 
be a difficult task.
118
 Nevertheless, this does not mean the crucial benefits of forests in 
mitigating climate change, or the consequence that forest decline pose to our 
atmosphere should be neglected. Forner (2006) posit “Despite the past failures, the 
importance that the international community has attributed to halting deforestation has 
kept international efforts alive, with the expectation that an international instrument will 
be agreed one day”.119  
 
True, the principles of international climate negotiations which were established in the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) long ago; 
signed in Rio in 1992, are now firmly gaining ground whereby it may soften 
sovereignty. This is because protection of forests for climate sake is crucial in that:  
Forests are vitally important in addressing climate change because 
forest ecosystems affect the climatic conditions experienced on 
earth’s climate through the absorption of carbon in wood, leaves and 
soil. This carbon is released to the atmosphere when forests are 
burned or during forest clearance and harvesting. Quantifying the 
role of forests as sources of carbon emissions and in their role as 
carbon sinks has become essential to understanding the global carbon 
cycle. 
120
 
 
The UNFCCC was formulated in 1992’s Rio summit and entered into force in 1994. 
Therefore the concern for climate change has been formally on the scene since 1994. 
Nevertheless, only recently has the issue of climate change shocked the ground of the 
world community with its potentially serious negative effects.
121
 On this score, it has 
been noted also that “Forest clearing and degradation account for roughly 15% of global 
greenhouse gas emissions, more than all the cars, trains, planes, ships, and trucks on 
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earth”.122 This means it is “(s)imply too big a piece of the problem to ignore; fail to 
reduce it and we will fail to stabilize our climate”.123 
 
3.2.1 UNFCCC: Objective of the Convention  
The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is enshrined under Article 2 of the convention. 
Within the meaning of this Article 2, the objective of this framework is “[…] 
stabilization of green house gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”. This objective 
of the framework convention aims at stabilizing the green house gas emissions. It does 
not however, strive to reverse its effects, but to slow.
124
 The objective has been 
reiterated in many international, intergovernmental and even domestic legal and policy 
documents. As the level of ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’ and the time frame 
at which the objective should be achieved has not been explicitly stated in the 
convention; Article 2 seems to merely suggest modest attempt to prevent the 
interference with climate change. 
 
In my understanding, this is why changes in climatic conditions have prevailed and yet 
occurring on an increasing pace. However, Voigt posits that “Stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations means, however, a significant reduction of 
emissions.”125 The other provision within the UNFCCC (though not objective, but 
related to deforestation) and general (for example, Article 4.1(d) provides for the 
promotion of the sustainable management of sinks and reservoirs), decisions that 
regulate these could also be general without the need to specify concrete targets. This 
option could request Parties to, for example, target financial assistance and enhance 
cooperation for the establishment of policies and measures to reduce deforestation.  
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In fact more general decision likely causes less controversy. However, its general 
character may also make it less effective in practice. Maguire describes dangerous 
anthropogenic interference as a real, and having already taken place.
126
 For instance, in 
Africa, besides the geographic location of the continent in the deserts of Sahara and 
Kalahari, exploitation of forests has greatly contributed to serious climate change which 
in turns amounted to drought that has caused a massive loss of human life in the 
continent. Furthermore, unlimited exploitation of forests by forest owner sovereign 
nations leads to the impairment of the overall quality of the global and the depletion of 
the resource base available for exploitation by future generation overburdens the future 
generations. 
 
Therefore, consistent with these statements the provision of Article 2 of the UNFCCC 
“[…] level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with climate 
system” has already been outweighed. The time framework as envisaged by same 
Article 2, “with in a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner” also seems to have not met. The 
comprehensive implication of the message contained in the above statements is that the 
climate change is very near to, and the discussion to avert its effect needs to be placed 
on the table of every sovereign state.  
 
As noted above, the objective of this frame work convention is stabilizing green house 
gas emissions. Protection of forests is critical for achieving the objective of the 
convention. Because, forests; according to Wangari Maathai,
127
 act as the “lungs of the 
atmosphere” by serving as carbon sinks, and hence stabilizes green house gas 
concentration. Therefore, although not explicitly about protection of forests per se, the 
UNFCCC is of prime relevance to protection of forests. Moreover, by shaping some of 
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the outlines of development of international forest law, this treaty has played a central 
role in protection of forests. For instance, in REDD: Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation’s negotiation under UNFCCC, protection of 
forests has been placed at the centre. Thus, the frame work convention (UNFCCC) can 
form conceptual basis for development of normative frame works pertaining to 
protection of forests.  
 
3.3  Protection of Forests in REDD: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation 
It is high that climate change is no longer theoretical, but it is real and has already 
occurred. This is therefore the main reason of protection of forests due to their climate 
mitigation role.
128
 REDD
129
 -a forestry based climate mitigation mechanism with its 
purpose i.e., an emission mitigation instrument focuses on carbon in forests than the 
forests themselves. Such instances make REDD to be perceived as a confusing picture. 
Nevertheless, though the aim of REDD is the stick of carbon in the wood, the 
inseparable i.e., complexities of forests leads the road to REDD’s appreciation of such 
forest issues when it is in a sense falls outside its rational.  
 
3.3.1 The Core Concepts of REDD 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation(REDD) is a climate 
change mitigation instrument presently designed and negotiated under the United 
Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC). REDD as 
development of policy on forest issues arose at the eleventh session of the Conference 
of the Parties (COP) held in Montreal in 2005.Those discussions began with RED (i.e. 
limited to deforestation only) and expanded to REDD with consideration of forest 
degradation, then broadened to further consider forest conservation, sustainable forest 
management, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (i.e. REDD+).  
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The concept of REDD is “[…] predicted on the assumption that forests will contribute 
to climate change mitigation only if their value increases to a level that makes 
protecting forests consistent with viable development strategies”130 It is brought about 
by the proposition of the governments of Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica. The two 
governments proposed REDD to be added to the agenda of COP 11 hosted in Montreal. 
In this COP, REDD attracted attentions and received broad support. The concept of 
REDD after this conference is widely stated as:  
An effective international mechanism for Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) may 
enable developing countries to merge the goals of national forest 
protection with their economic development, while helping combat 
climate change. REDD is therefore, an essential element in a viable 
global climate policy framework, and has gained global attention as a 
potentially effective and low-cost climate change mitigation option.
131
 
 
REDD is developed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) in the context of global forest protection. Avoiding deforestation 
and forest degradation is noted as a highly cost-effective way of reducing green house 
gas emissions.
132
 Therefore, this accrues to forests a great deal of international and 
national attention with in the climate change regime. In other words, this approach to 
protection of forests for the climate sake is a positive signal for the development of 
future international forest law. The Copenhagen Accord (2009); the Cancun Agreement 
(2010); and the Durban summit (2011) exemplify this. Under these meetings protection 
of forests has attracted attentions and become the key concern for developed and 
developing nations alike. And states also seem to have softened their sovereignty and 
strengthened their common interests on protection of forests. Nevertheless, the COP15 
in Copenhagen (2009) was ‘disappointing’ for the climate change agenda was too 
ambitious, and also because the President of the Convention (the Denmark minister) 
was unable to mediate the enormous differences among all the Parties (192 
                                                 
130  Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD): An Options Assessment 
Report, for Government of Norway (2009)  
 
131
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132  Stern N (2006) pp. 337- 537. 
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countries).
133
 It resulted in a nonbinding Accord, but provided the basis for the 
discussions in the COP16-the Cancun Agreement. COP16 was termed as more realistic 
than the Copenhagen summit; it integrated the five lines of the Bali Action Plan in to 
the UN process which were also discussed in COP15:
134
  
 Mitigation: To define goals of reduction of emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation- REDD+ 
 
  Financial support: To define mechanisms and commitments for long term 
support from the Annex-I to non-Annex I Parties 
 
 Adaptation: To define financial support for climate action plans and regional 
scale projects 
 
  Technology transfer: To transfer clean technologies and capacity building 
 
 Long term vision: To advance in the negotiations to define collective goals to 
reduce emissions to avoid increases of temperature greater than 2_C in the near 
future. 
 
According to the same author, in Cancun Agreement, the international community has 
arrived on consensus on a multilateral agreement that covers four of the five major 
topics of the agenda. It was signed by all parties (192 countries) including Japan, the 
United States, and China that initially had large differences. These four major accords 
of the Cancun Agreement are: 
a) Deforestation Accord: its objectives are to establish a financial framework 
and to reinforce bilateral and multilateral efforts for forest protection and 
prevent clear-cutting. The framework would allow developed countries to 
finance others for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation 
(REDD+). The agreement requires developing countries to create national 
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  Cavazos (2012), P. 153 
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climate change action plans, establish a baseline for historic emissions from 
forest loss and create a system for monitoring their forest. 
 
b) Green Climate Fund: This fund was proposed by Mexico in Copenhagen; it 
was rescued in the COP16 and accepted by the Parties. This fund will be 
managed by developed and underdeveloped countries to support adaptation 
and mitigation strategies. 
 
c) Cancun Adaptation Framework: This framework is a guide for the decisions 
to support adaptation strategies in underdeveloped countries. The 
Convention established an Adaptation Committee to provide coherence in 
the implementation of the adaptation plans, to provide advice on financial 
mechanisms and eligibility for the new fund, to carry out reviews of 
portfolios of adaptation projects, and to facilitate the full implementation of 
these programs in underdeveloped countries. The Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF) will act as interim ministry of the Adaptation Fund Board 
and the World Bank will act as the interim trustee for the Adaptation Fund 
and the Adaptation Fund Board. 
 
d) Technology Transfer: To support developing countries with clean energies, 
green technologies and capacity building. 
 
Cavazos also defines the Cancun Agreement as historic agreement on protection of 
forests, and adaptation and technology frameworks to help the developing countries 
adopt clean energy and to adapt to climate change. He further explains that the Cancun 
Agreement has also recognized the gravity of global warming and set a goal of limiting 
average warming to 2_C above preindustrial levels. A lower limit of 1.5_C in its future 
negotiations was also considered in the summit to avoid vulnerability of small insular 
countries to sea-level rise. 
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In Cancun Agreement, the principle of ‘Common, but Differentiated Responsibility’ 
was adopted as an important resolution in their approach to reduce GHG emissions. 
These actions, Cavazos notes, will be registered through a system of monitoring, report, 
and international verification (MRV). Parties agreed to reduce emissions according to 
their own capabilities. This means both developed and developing states assumed 
responsibility to put a stop to the deterioration of forests in their respective sovereignty 
while new international reporting system tracks their progress. 
 
Within the meaning of the Cancun Agreement, countries are required to submit 
standardized MRV reports based on IPCC measurement criteria; in particular, 
developing countries will need to carry out the MRV to be able to request and to receive 
financial support through the four major Cancun accords. This requirement enjoins 
states with the obligation to make environmental impact assessment whereby it lessens 
environmental law enforcement challenges in a way that it reduces race to the bottom 
(cheap environmental policy) commonly practiced in forest-rich sovereign states. It was 
agreed that a total of US$30 billion in fast start finance from developed countries will 
be available to support climate action in the developing world up to 2012, and the 
intention to raise US$100 billion in long term fund by 2020. 
 
In sum, the resolutions signed in the Cancun Agreement made significant progress from 
COP15 in Copenhagen and set the basis for the December 2011 Durban negotiation in 
South Africa. Nevertheless, the emission reduction commitments and distribution of 
such efforts have not been resolved in Durban either; but, it ended as “one small 
promising step for climate change”135 Therefore, a few times is a must necessity to 
actually establish a new forestry based climate architecture.  
 
However, this shall not be construed as the rules global community has crafted under 
the above summits to implement the REDD instruments to protection of forests are 
                                                 
135
 Climate Brief: Focus on the Economics of Climate Change (2011)  
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without effects. They rather have potential of interference with the sovereignty of states 
concerned. Because, they demand the states at issue to adopt a new forest management 
laws and practices. And these states are deemed to behave in consonant with the 
international rules sought to protect forests global wise. “[…] with the introduction of 
markets for environmental services, state sovereignty concerns may not be as dominant 
as in previous international regimes”.136  
 
The purpose of REDD under the above summits is mainly to serve as an instrument of 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation i.e. to provide incentives 
to developing countries to decrease the level of deforestation and forest degradation 
taking place on unsustainable level. This in a way relieves forest-rich developing 
countries party from being the sole duty bearers in relation to protection of forests 
which to certain extent erodes their sovereignty. “This is because parties will be 
economically rewarded for infringements upon their sovereignty […]”.137 Thus, the 
states’ crafting to implement the REDD instruments; and conference after conference is 
also making progresses detailed and protective; nonetheless, a close scrutiny reveals 
that the REDD+ issues including its framework legal content is taking shape. But, 
whether it will arrive soon enough for protection of forests at best remains to be seen.  
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4 Conclusions 
My first research question was “Is sovereignty a key obstacle for the development of 
binding international forest law?” At the very start of my analysis, I clearly 
demonstrated that the practical implementation of norms related to protection of forests 
shall fall in to the domain of state sovereignty. Since 1992 in Rio, the principle of state 
sovereignty has become the key obstacle to states’ adopting a binding international 
forest law. Therefore, the likely failure to protect forests internationally in the concrete 
level with in a state can be put to the shoulders of traditional concept of state 
sovereignty and the soft law nature of forest regimes.  
 
But it is my conviction that this does not mean one should fall into despair and conceive 
any attempt to save our global forests-common interests, as a lose case. From 
constructive angle, norms as the rest of our social reality, socially constructed. They are 
neither static nor outside our reach. Norms can be violated, referring to sovereignty. 
 
My second research question was the following “Can states because of sovereignty 
violate available principles and conventions to destroy forests with impunity or are 
there some balancing mechanisms?” Pertinent with this, I found out that there are some 
problems of a clash between sovereignty and international approaches to protection of 
forests. They both can co-exist when the uses of forests by states do not interfere with 
the interests of others; but, they surely collide when states fail to share responsibility 
with protection of forests and yet skeptical to the international community’s 
interference. This means that there is a power balance between states sovereignty and 
international approaches to protection of forests. Therefore, states cannot destroy forests 
with impunity. Under CBD and UNFCCC treaty regimes, nations are even better off in 
that they can continue to receive the benefits of protecting forests for biodiversity and 
climate sake. Given the enthusiasm with which the EU nations, and even the United 
States, are responding to the climate change crisis (with initiatives such as the Cancun 
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REDD Agreements, or the volunteering to pay for forests upkeep); I do not find that 
there could be other reasons behind developed countries which keep forest-rich states so 
skeptical about such interference with sovereignty for international support if countries 
decide to stop destroying their forests. Despite the language of the treaties, I do not also 
see that it is lawful, whatsoever forest-rich sovereigns provide as justification to 
consider the rules on protection of forests as optional. And neither do I accept the 
excuses they seek to make for their resistance to protection of forests in response to 
common interest as legitimate. Because, from a legal point of view, such instance 
tantamount to violation of principles and conventions I dealt with in the analysis; and 
symbolizes an irresponsible stance neglecting an urgent problem-destruction of forests. 
Right now the globe’s generations are experiencing threats to their common interest due 
to forest destruction, and to the future generations, suffocation is going to be a 
commonplace death cause. Such a case necessitates protection of forests to be seen 
from the human rights angle.  
 
To conclude based on my analysis, unlike its provisions in the traditional law, 
sovereignty in the case of protection of forests can be softened by the ‘no-harm rules’, 
and other principles and conventions which tie it to common responsibility. And 
protection of forests in return completely falls under the jurisdictions of the ‘no- harm 
rules’, human rights, CBD, UNFCCC and the REDD treaty regimes; and also under 
secondary rules that govern the destructive behavior of states when the primary rules 
pertaining to protection of forests are violated. 
 
Consequently, despite absence of concrete international law relating to protection of 
global forests at present, the provisions enshrined under these principles, and 
conventions are important tools that can usefully be deployed to limit sovereignty and 
prevent further destruction of forests for sure. They are also momentous and influential 
legal rules and frameworks which can institutionalize protection of forests into a 
binding international forest law.  
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